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Abstract
This paper presents a profile of non-executive directors of Australia’s largest public
companies. Using descriptive data, it assesses the extent to which these companies
adhere to the requirements set down in the Australian Stock Exchange’s Principles of
Good Corporate Governance. In relation to these profiles, the generic roles of nonexecutive directors are discussed and evaluated in terms of their actual and perceived
independence from management. The paper concludes with an examination of the
need for independence and questions whether competence, among other
characteristics, is a more valuable characteristic of a non-executive director than
independence.
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1.

Introduction
In the wake of high profile business collapses such as Enron, WorldCom, HIH

Insurance, and OneTel, and the increase in shareholder activism, public attention has
become more focussed on corporate governance (Petra, 2005; Peaker, 2003; Roberts
et al., 2005). A common feature of these corporate scandals has been an inadequate
system of corporate governance (O’Regan et al., 2005). Defined as the “system by
which companies are directed and controlled” (ASX, 2003, p.3; Long et al., 2005,
p.667), corporate governance is concerned with the “duties and responsibilities of a
company’s board of directors in managing the company” (Pass, 2004, p.52).
Conflicts of interest between company directors and executives have prompted
both legislative and non-legislative reform aimed at safeguarding the interests of
corporate stakeholders and strengthening the independence of company boards
through the appointment of non-executive directors. Described as the “mainstay of
good governance” (Editorial, 2003, p.287), non-executive directors are considered to
be a guarantee of the integrity and accountability of company boards. Although
efforts to define the role of a non-executive director are said to have “taxed the
nation’s finest intellects” (Ham, 2002), non-executive directors typically participate in
long-term decision making, contribute external business expertise, identify potential
business opportunities, and monitor the actions of company executives (Pass 2004,
Long et al., 2005; Higgs, 2003).
Much of the academic literature concerning corporate governance and board
composition in Australia and elsewhere has sought to establish causal relationships
between board structure and firm performance or sought to apply a theoretical
explanation for the behaviour of corporate boards. Kiel and Nicholson (2003), for
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example, examined the top 348 companies in the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX),
describing the board composition, examining the correlates of board composition, and
attempting to link board demographics with corporate performance. Sharma (2004)
studied the relationship between board independence and fraud across a sample of 62
Australian listed companies. He found that the presence of independent directors on
company boards, and the absence of duality (board of director chairman not also
being the CEO) significantly reduced the likelihood of fraud (Sharma, 2004). In the
Malaysian context, Abdullah (2006) used regression analysis to predict, inter alia, the
relationship between board independence and financial distress using a sample of
companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia, finding no statistically significant
relationships between these variables.
Long et al. (2005) compared the role of non-executive directors between listed
and unlisted UK companies. Based on a series of semi-structured interviews which
covered issues relating to strategy involvement, financial monitoring, and overall
board contribution, they found that non-executive directors on listed boards are
inhibited by high levels of visibility, shareholder perception, information asymmetry,
and the impact of corporate governance regulation (Long et al., 2005). Brennan and
McDermott (2004) assessed the extent of independence of boards of companies listed
on the Irish stock exchange, profiling 80 company’s boards and their adherence to the
independence requirements set out in the Higgs Report.
Interestingly,

Hooghiemstra

and

van

Manen

(2004)

proposed

“independence paradox” concerning the role of non-executive directors.

an
They

conducted telephone interviews and mail questionnaires to survey the opinions of
Dutch non-executive directors regarding their roles and limitations. They found that,
although non-executive directors are expected to operate independently from
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management, in practice, they are unable to do so because they rely on this same
group to provide them with the information necessary for decision making, thus
leading to an independence paradox (Hooghiemstra and van Manen, 2004, p.322).
In an examination of the characteristics of non-executive directors in the UK,
Pass (2004) conducted an empirical study of 50 listed companies. Gathering data on
non-executive directors’ characteristics such as age, gender, length of service,
remuneration, and other directorships, Pass’s (2004) study presented a comprehensive
profile of non-executive directors within large UK companies and considered the
consistency of this profile with the requirements and recommendations contained in
legislative reforms. The value of studies such as that conducted by Pass (2004) was
noted by Pettigrew (1992, p.178):
…the study of boards and their directors has not been helped by overambitious attempts to link independent variables such as board composition
to outcome variables such as board and firm performance. The task perhaps
is a simpler one, to…provide some basic descriptive findings about boards
and their directors.

Following the lead of Pass’s (2004) study, and keeping in mind the comments of
Pettigrew (1992), this research provides a descriptive profile of the non-executive
directors of Australia’s largest public companies. In the next section, the Australian
corporate governance framework is reviewed. This is followed by details of the
sample of companies examined and a description of the characteristics of the nonexecutive directors of these companies. Finally conclusions are presented, along with
research limitations and suggestions for future research.
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2.

Background: Corporate governance in Australia
Corporate governance policy reform in Australia has primarily been a

response to both local and international corporate collapses, which were largely due to
fraudulent behaviour and practices of key executives and inadequate corporate
governance systems. Even though the Australian corporate failures “lacked the global
impact of American failures like Enron and WorldCom” (Robins, 2006, p.34),
Australian organisations such as HIH Insurance, and OneTel brought home the reality
of the larger, and more publicised, collapses of US organisations. The US response
was principally legislative, for example the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. In Australia
the response has been a mix of legislative and non-legislative initiatives which have
included the development of the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit
Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act, known as “CLERP 9”, the adoption of the
International Financial Reporting Standards, and the establishment of a Corporate
Governance Council by the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) (Robins, 2006).
Work began on CLERP 9 in September 2002, with one of the key aims being
to restore public confidence in corporate Australia by strengthening the disclosure,
financial reporting, and governance framework within which Australian businesses
operate. Concurrently, the ASX’s Corporate Governance Council established ten
Principles of Good Corporate Governance, which were released in March 2003 (see
Figure 1). These ten principles, and associated recommendations and guidelines,
were intended to optimise “corporate performance and accountability in the interests
of shareholders and the broader community” (ASX, 2003, p.5). Recognising that not
all companies have the same reporting and disclosure requirements, the ASX
Principles were not made compulsory, however if a listed entity elected not to follow
the recommendations, justification must be provided.
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Take in Figure 1

As shown in Figure 1, the second principle refers to the structure of the board
of directors. It is recommended that boards of listed organisations have a majority of
non executive independent directors so that the board is able to appropriately
discharge its responsibilities and duties.

The purpose of non-executive director

independence, both actual and perceived, is to provide key stakeholders such as
shareholders and regulators with confidence that the director is sufficiently removed
from the management of the organisation and “free of any business or other
relationship that could materially interfere with the exercise of their unfettered and
independent judgement” (ASX, 2003, p.19).

Reiter and Rosenberg (2003, p.1)

supported this argument by explaining that the true independent director is one who is
“unconstrained by potential conflicts of interest will bring the sort of rigour and
critical analysis required to limit recurrences of the debacles we have seen, and restore
investor confidence”.
Leblanc and Gillies (2003) suggested that an effective board is composed of
directors who are independent and competent and behave in manner that supports
these characteristics. Competence has been measured by reference to such factors as
years of experience, qualifications, and breadth of experience (O’Higgins, 2002; Pass,
2004). However ascertaining whether or not a director is truly independent is more
subjective and it may be difficult to determine the level of independence of particular
directors (Leblanc and Gillies, 2003). The ASX recommendations enable a nonexecutive director to be classified as independent provided he or she is not a
substantial shareholder of the company, has not been employed by the company in an
executive capacity during the last three years, has not been a material professional
advisor of the company during the last three years, has no material contractual
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relationship with the company (ASX, 2003). However, while a director may meet the
ASX definition of an independent director, social relationships, friendships and other
forms of conflicts can compromise independence (Leblanc and Gillies, 2003). Young
(2003, p.2) defines this ASX-type definition of independence as “resume
independence”.
To examine the profile of non-executive directors serving on the boards of
Australian listed companies, a sample was selected from the ASX 50 listing. Details
of the sample and the data gathered is provided in the following section.

3.

Empirical tests

3.1 Sample selection
A sample of 42 companies was selected from the ASX 50, which comprises
the 50 largest stocks by market capitalisation in Australia (ASX, 2006). A list of the
companies selected for the analysis is presented in Appendix 1. Eight companies
were eliminated from the sample because information concerning the non-executive
directors was absent or the company structure was not typical of a reporting entity (for
example, Macquarie Airports which consists of three entities, a company incorporated
in Bermuda, and two trust vehicles (Macquarie Airports, 2006)).
The 42 companies that comprised the sample group for this study were drawn
from 9 industry sectors, as summarised in Table 1.
Take in Table 1

The 2004 annual report for each company of the sample was obtained and,
consistent with Pass (2004), the following information gathered:
•

Non-executive directors as a percentage of total Board of Directors

•

Age and gender of non-executive directors

•

Average length of service of non-executive directors
7

•

Remuneration of non-executive directors

•

Ownership of shares by non-executive directors

•

Professional background of non-executive directors

•

Number of other non-executive directorships

The results from this analysis are presented in the following section.

4.

Results
A total of 301 non-executive directors were employed by the sample

companies during 2004. As Table 2 shows, in 35 companies (83 percent of the
sample), non-executive directors comprised 80 percent or more of total board
membership.
Take in Table 2

These results are consistent with the ASX Principles of Good Corporate
Governance, which recommend that a majority of the board should be independent
(ASX). The results also show an improvement in the independence of Australian
company boards when compared to Kiel and Nicholson’s (2003) study, which
reported that in the top 348 companies included in their sample, the mean proportion
of non-executive directors on company boards was 69 percent. This is likely to be a
consequence of the issue of the ASX Principles in March 2003.2 It appears that
Australian boards are more independent than those in the UK, with the majority of
Pass’s (2004) companies having non-executive directors comprising between 50 and
60 percent of the total board.

2

Kiel and Nicholson’s (2003) study was first presented at the 5th International Conference on
Corporate Governance and Direction in October 2002, meaning that the data they reported on was
likely to be at least a year old by the time the ASX Principles were published.
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In terms of average age of Australian non-executive directors, the majority of
non-executive directors were aged between 60 and 69, which is consistent with the
results of Pass (2004) in the UK context (see Table 3).
Take in Table 3
Take in Table 4

As shown in Table 4, in terms of gender 35 of the Australian companies
examined (83 percent) had one or more female non-executive directors on the board.
As a proportion of male and female non-executive directors, females comprised 16
percent. This compares to Pass’s (2004) study which showed that 58 percent of UK
companies had one or more female board members, and women represented 11
percent of the total number of non-executive directors examined. Both these and
Pass’s (2004) results appear to be an improvement on the situation described by Li
and Wearing (2004), which reported that only 6 percent of non-executive directors in
the top 350 UK listed companies were female and suggested that women face a
“second glass ceiling” even after reaching board level (Li and Wearing, 2004, p.355).
Table 5 reports the average length of service of non-executive directors. The
average length of service ranged from 1 year to 21 years.
Take in Table 5

This information is relevant to assessing the independence of directors.
According to ASX Principle 2, an independent director must “not have served on the
board for a period which could, or could reasonably be perceived to, materially
interfere with the director’s ability to act in the best interests of the company” (ASX,
2003, p.20).

The median length of time served is consistent with Pass (2004),

however the substantial length of time served by some non-executive directors could
reasonably be perceived to interfere with the independence of these board members
and thus conflict with the ASX Principles.
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Table 6 provides details of the remuneration of the non-executive directors of
the sampled companies. The majority of companies sampled (67%) provided their
non-executive directors with average remuneration package in excess of A$140,000.
In accordance with the ASX Principles, the disclosure of non-executive directors’
remuneration was clear and adequately distinguished from the remuneration structure
applied to company executives.
Take in Table 6

Table 7 shows the ownership of ordinary shares by the non-executive
directors. According to the ASX Principles, non-executive directors are permitted to
receive remuneration in the form of equity but should not receive share options.
Many of the companies sampled included shares in the remuneration packages offered
to non-executive directors.
Take in Table 7

Table 8 indicates the general background of the 302 non-executive directors of
the survey companies. The majority of non-executive directors (95%) are also current
executives in other organisations and, as shown in Table 8, hold other directorships,
both executive and non-executive.
Take in Table 8

Finally, as indicated in Table 9, the majority of non-executive directors in the
companies studied hold between one and four other directorships. Many of these
directorships are held with other companies within the ASX 50. For example, Ms
Elizabeth Alexander serves on the boards of Amcor Ltd, Boral Ltd, and CSL Ltd, all
of which are ASX 50 listed companies, and Mr Don Argus serves on the boards of
BHP Billiton Ltd and Brambles Industries Ltd, also on the ASX 50.
Take in Table 9
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5.

Summary and conclusion
This study has indicated that Australia’s largest listed companies are

beginning to adopt the ASX Principles of Good Corporate Governance. One of the
key issues in Australian corporate governance reform has been the appointment of
independent non-executive directors to company boards (ASX, 2003; Robins, 2006).
In this analysis, the data shows that for 83% of the sample the ratio of independent
directors to executive (non-independent) directors is 4:1, indicating that this principle
has indeed been embraced by Australian companies.
However, despite the appointment of non-executive directors to corporate
boards, concerns as to the actual and perceived independence of these directors
persist. While actual independence may be difficult to ascertain without being privy
to the nuances of boardroom friendships, social relationships, and other forms of
potential conflict, the perception of independence may be significantly compromised
by the levels of remuneration received by non-executive directors. In the companies’
sample, the average level of remuneration was in excess of $140,000. It would be
difficult to explain to key stakeholders at an annual general meeting that a nonexecutive director of a company can act independently while at the same time
receiving such substantial compensation. The ASX Principles address this issue by
simply stating that the level of remuneration must be “sufficient and reasonable”
(ASX, 2003, p.51). The subjectivity of these terms inhibits their usefulness as a
source of valuable guidance. A related issue was identified by Hooghiemstra and van
Manen (2004) as the independence paradox which arises due to independent directors,
in the course of fulfilling their responsibilities, relying heavily on the information
provided by the same executives from whom they are to said to be independent.
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There is little doubt that the presence of competent independent directors on
the boards of companies is a significant benefit to the majority of stakeholders of
organisations, particularly shareholders and regulators. The independent directors can
contribute significantly to organisations through setting organisational strategy,
monitoring the performance of and reporting from executive management, and
contributing to the development or removal of executive management. However, is
the benefit to key stakeholders the result of directors’ independence, their competence
or a mixture of both? The lack of prescriptive legislation in Australia, the fact that the
current ASX guidelines are based on a “comply or explain” philosophy (Higgs, 2003),
and the absence of specific guidance on the role of independent directors in the ASX
guidelines means that concern over the independence of non-executive directors is
likely to continue.
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Appendix 1: Companies selected for analysis from the ASX 50

Symbol
AWC
AMC
AMP
ALL
ANZ
AGL
BHP
BSL
BLD
BIL
CCL
CML
CBA
CSL
FXJ
FGL
IAG
JHX
LLC
MBL
NAB
NCM
ORI
ORG
PMN
PBL
QAN
QBE
RIN
RIO
STO
SGB
SGP
SUN
TAH
TLS
TCL
WES
WDC
WBC
WPL
WOW

Company
Alumina Limited
Amcor Limited
AMP Limited
Aristocrat Leisure Limited
Australia And New Zealand Banking Group Limited
Australian Gas Light Company (The)
BHP Billiton Limited
Bluescope Steel Limited
Boral Limited
Brambles Industries Limited
Coca-Cola Amatil Limited
Coles Myer Limited
Commonwealth Bank Of Australia
CSL Limited
Fairfax (John) Holdings Limited
Foster's Group Limited
Insurance Australia Group Limited
James Hardie Industries N.V.
Lend Lease Corporation Limited
Macquarie Bank Limited
National Australia Bank Limited
Newcrest Mining Limited
Orica Limited
Origin Energy Limited
Promina Group Limited
Publishing & Broadcasting Limited
Qantas Airways Limited
Qbe Insurance Group Limited
Rinker Group Limited
Rio Tinto Limited
Santos Limited
St George Bank Limited
Stockland
Suncorp-Metway Limited.
Tabcorp Holdings Limited
Telstra Corporation Limited.
Transurban Group
Wesfarmers Limited
Westfield Group
Westpac Banking Corporation
Woodside Petroleum Limited
Woolworths Limited

Sector
Materials
Materials
Financials
Consumer Discretionary
Financials
Utilities
Materials
Materials
Materials
Industrials
Consumer Staples
Consumer Staples
Financials
Health Care
Consumer Discretionary
Consumer Staples
Financials
Materials
Financials
Financials
Financials
Materials
Materials
Energy
Financials
Consumer Discretionary
Industrials
Financials
Materials
Materials
Energy
Financials
Financials
Financials
Consumer Discretionary
Telecommunications
Industrials
Industrials
Financials
Financials
Energy
Consumer Staples
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Figures and tables
Figure 1: ASX Principles of Good Corporate Governance

A company should:
1. Lay solid foundations for management and oversight
Recognise and publish the respective roles and responsibilities of board and management.
2. Structure the board to add value
Have a board of an effective composition, size and commitment to adequately discharge its
responsibilities and duties.
3. Promote ethical and responsible decision-making
Actively promote ethical and responsible decision-making.
4. Safeguard integrity in financial reporting
Have a structure to independently verify and safeguard the integrity of the company’s financial
reporting.
5. Make timely and balanced disclosure
Promote timely and balanced disclosure of all material matters concerning the company.
6. Respect the rights of shareholders
Respect the rights of shareholders and facilitate the effective exercise of those rights.
7. Recognise and manage risk
Establish a sound system of risk oversight and management and internal control.
8. Encourage enhanced performance
Fairly review and actively encourage enhanced board and management effectiveness.
9. Remunerate fairly and responsibly
Ensure that the level and composition of remuneration is sufficient and reasonable and that its
relationship to corporate and individual performance is defined.
10. Recognise the legitimate interests of stakeholders
Recognise legal and other obligations to all legitimate stakeholders.
Source: ASX, 2003
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Utilities
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Table 1: Industry sectors represented in the sample

Sector
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Number of
companies within
percentile

Table 2: Non-executive directors as a percentage of total
Board of Directors
40
30
20
10
0
0%25%

30%39%

40%49%

50%59%

60%69%

70%79%

80%+

Non-executive directors as a percentage of total

Number of companies
within category

Table 3: Average age of Non-executive directors
20
15
10
5
0
Less than 50

50-59

60-69

70+

Not available

Age in years

Number of
companies within
category

Table 4: Number of female non-executive directors per
Board
25
20
15
10
5
0
0

1

2

3+

Number of female non-executive directors

Number of
companies within
category

Table 5: Average length of service of Non-executive
directors
20
15
10
5
0
0-3

3-4

5-6

7-8

9-10

10+

Average length of service (years)
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Table 6: Rem uneration of Non-exeuctive Directors

Number of
companies in
category

20
15
10
5
0
0-70

70-90

90-100 100-120 120-140 140-160

160+

Average rem uneration (A$'000)

Number of companies
within category

Table 7: Ownership of shares by Non-executive Directors
10
8
6
4
2
0
0-10

10-20

20-30

30-50

50-70

70-100

100+

Average number of shares ('000)

Number of nonexecutive directors
within category

Table 8: Professional background of Non-executive
Directors
400
300
200
100
0
Former executives

Current executives

Professional background

Number of nonexecutive directors
within category

Table 9: Number of other Non-executive Directorships held
80
60
40
20
0
0

1

2

3

4

5

Over 5

Number held
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